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The Determinants of Immigration-Policy Preferences in Advanced
Economies: A Cross-Country Study
By Joseph P. Daniels and Marc von der Ruhr*
This paper employs survey data to examine the determinants of immigration-policy
preferences among ten advanced economies. Ordered probit specifications suggest that
skill level is a robust determinant of immigration-policy preferences and that less-skilled
workers are more likely to express a preference for policies that restrict immigration. The
results also suggest that older individuals, members of trade unions, and those who classify
their political ideology as conservative are more likely to favor limiting immigration while
non-citizens are less likely to favor such policies. Individual country-level regression results
vary, in particular with regard to the influence of trade union member- ship, which is a
robust determinant of immigration-policy preferences for both measures of skill in only a
subset of nations. (JEL FO, F2, HO)

Introduction
The process of globalization continues to be the subject of considerable debate.
Controversy surrounds many aspects of globalization, including the impact that increasing trade
and capital flows have on economies, the role and influence international institutions should have
on national policies, and the effect of immigration policies on destination economies. Recently,
particularly in Europe, policies governing legal immigration are at the center of political debate.
Public views toward immigration policy are the focus of this paper.
It is a widely held belief that increased immigration decreases workers incomes in the
destination country and increases unemployment among native workers [Friedberg and Hunt,
1995]. Though each concern represents a relevant economic question, popular beliefs and
economic theory seem at odds with each other. In fact, most economic studies find small net
gains in GDP per capita to host countries from increased immigration and that past immigration
has had no obvious impact on unemployment in the host country. (For evidence and a summary
of the literature, see Coppel, et al. [2001]).
This tension between the public opinion of the perceived effects of immigration on a host
economy and the actual economic impact creates an interesting policy problem. On the one
hand, special interest groups and non-governmental organizations are becoming more globally
organized, thereby increasing their capabilities of influencing economic policy in several
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countries simultaneously [OECD, 1996]. This influence is, at least in part, based on popular
public opinion. On the other hand, as suggested above, a significant portion of public opinion is
inconsistent with actual economic outcomes. Consequently, there is the possibility that policies
increasingly are affected by misguided opinion rather than data or theory. As a result, it is a
valuable exercise to study the determinants of individual level immigration-policy preferences so
economists can better understand possible sources of misinformation among the general public.
There are a number of excellent studies in the economics literature on the effects of
immigration on host economies, and of immigration. Yet, as Scheve and Slaughter [2001] point
out, little research has focused on the determinants of individual preferences regarding
immigration policy. They argue that only after individual preferences are understood can
reasonable policy-making efforts be made.
This paper extends Scheve and Slaughter's analysis of the U.S. to present new evidence
on immigration-policy preferences across ten advanced economies. The data is unique in that it
results from a single survey instrument employed during a given year across a number of
economies. This study, therefore, contributes to the literature in a two important ways. First, it
tests whether skill level--as measured by education and relative income is a robust determinant
of immigration-policy preferences across a large sample of advanced economies. Second, it
considers not only aggregated results across ten countries, but also examines results for reach
individual country included in the sample.
The empirical examination shows that skill level is a robust determinant of immigrationpolicy preferences, that is, less skilled workers are more likely to want limits on immigration. The
results also suggest that individuals are more likely to favor policies limiting immigration as they:
(1) are older, (2) are members of trade unions, and (3) classify their political ideology as
conservative. The results also indicate that individuals who are not citizens of their country, or
whose parents are not citizens of the respondent's country are less likely to favor policies that
restrict immigration. Individual country-level regression results do vary, in particular with regard
to the influence of trade union membership. This last result suggests a need for further research
on how political opinions and activities of trade unions vary across countries.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section two reviews pertinent
literature that gauges general public opinion and explains the political economy of trade-policy
preferences. Section three presents the key results of a cross-national survey, thereby describing the dependent variable of the authors' analysis. Section four describes the empirical
treatment of the data and provides the results of the analysis and their interpretation. Section five
offers a summary and suggestions for future research.
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The Political Economy of Immigration-Policy Preferences
The majority of research on the determinants of immigration pohcy in host countries has
focused on immigration politics. This is not surprising, as migration politics historically developed
along with economic development because these policies are used to influence the size and
composition of the labor force.
Historically, immigration policy seems to have been influenced by labor market
conditions in a given country, whereas immigrant flows have been strongly linked to labor
market differences between countries. Williamson [1998] lists a series of historical events linking
immigration restrictions to labor market conditions as opposed to actual immigrant flows. It
initially seems understandable that an economy experiencing higher unemployment or lagging
wages may restrict immigration. Friedberg and Hunt [1995], however, find that there is not much
support in the economic literature to the claim that immigrants have an impact on wages and
employment of residents native to the market absorbing the immigrants. Further, as mentioned
in the introduction, Coppel, et al. find that most empirical research indicates small net gains in
GDP per capita to host countries from increased immigration and that past immigration has no
obvious impact on unemployment in the host country.
Because this analysis of individual level immigration-policy preferences extends the
recent work of Scheve and Slaughter on the United States, the reader is referred to their more
extensive summary of the literature and explanation of the underlying theory. The authors appeal
to two common international trade theories in order to logically evaluate the likely impact of
immigration on a host economy: the Heckscher-Ohlin (H-O) model, and the specific- factors
model. Both theories address the effect of increased immigration on input factors' returns in order
to explain how individuals evaluate the effect of increased immigration on their income.
Following the previous work, three implicit assumptions are made in applying these
models. First, it is assumed that current factor income plays a major role in how people view their
own economic well-being. Second, it is assumed that native workers in an economy believe that
legal immigration increases the supply of relatively low-skilled workers; a reasonable assumption
to characterize the advanced economies that are considered. Finally, it is assumed that labor
markets are flexible enough to allow for full employment. The role of factor payments and income
can thus be specifically addressed without concern for unemployment. Given these assumptions,
much of an advanced economy resident's attitude towards immigration can be credibly attributed
to how an influx of labor will influence that resident's income via their factor payment.
The first theoretical framework applied is the H-O model, which allows for interregional
and intersectoral labor mobility. Consequently, the model has no geographically segmented
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labor markets within a country. The effect of immigration on wages depends on both the
magnitude of immigration and the influence the host economy has on world prices. Assuming a
relatively small inflow of immigrants and a relatively small economy, wages are not affected
because the effect of immigrants is absorbed via changes in the mix of output produced. The
change in the mix of skilled and unskilled laborers merely motivates firms to produce more of the
good that uses that type of labor more intensively. With world trade, the output change is shared
with the rest of the world. If the country is not large enough to alter world prices, then wages do
not change.
Wages do change, however, when the country welcoming the immigrants is large enough
to change world output product prices. When world output prices change, the StolperSamuelson theorem states that wages will change, as well. A relative increase in the price of an
output will increase the real return to the factor used relatively intensively in the production of that
output industry and reduce the real return to the other factor. Thus, the link between
immigration-policy preferences and skill depends upon whether an individual believes that the
inflow of immigrants will change wages. If an individual sees no such relationship, there should
be no link between skill level and immigration preferences. Conversely, if the individual does
expect a relationship, there will be a link.
A similar approach is taken by the second theoretical model that is applied; the specificfactors model. In contrast to the H-O model, the specific-factors model assumes that in each
sector, there exists one input that cannot migrate between sectors, thereby making it "specific" to
a given sector. There is, however, another input that is freely mobile between sectors. If this
model is applied to the issue of immigration, it may be assumed that skilled labor is the fixed
input and unskilled labor is the mobile input. The model predicts that as the endowment of the
mobile factor (unskilled labor) increases, its own real income will fall while the real income of the
specific factor (skilled labor) will rise.1
Based on these theories, the leading channel by which immigration affects individuals is
through its perceived impact on individuals' labor-market returns. Past work that studied
immigration policies includes Goldin [1994], who finds that the U.S. House of Representatives, in
1915, was more likely to vote for immigration literacy tests (thereby lowering immigration) the
lower the wage increases in various districts between 1907 and 1915. Timmer and Williamson
[1998] similarly consider political actions to infer facts regarding immigration preferences. They
study five countries between 1860 and 1930 and find that more restrictive immigration policies to
be correlated with a lower level of unskilled wages relative to average per-capita income. Not all
studies find similar results. Citrin et al. [1997] find that personal economic circumstances play a
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small role in the formation of personal opinions. Espenshade and Hempstead [1996] find mixed
evidence relating skill level and immigration restrictions. Scheve and Slaughter [2001] find that
less-skilled workers are significantly more likely to prefer limiting immigrant inflows to the U.S.
They find no evidence, however, that the relationship between skill and immigration policy
preferences is stronger in high-immigration, or gateway, communities. This paper contributes to
the literature by studying individuals' preferences of immigration-policies across ten advanced
economies in an effort to directly measure the impact of various demographic variables on
immigration-policy preferences from a global perspective. Further, it tests the robustness of skill
level as a determinant of immigration-policy preferences by employing two different measures of
skill: education and relative income. Finally, this paper considers the differences in
immigration-policy preferences across each individual country to compare the results with the
aggregated regression results.

Description of Data on Immigration-Policy Preferences in the Advanced
Economies
The data employed in this study are the results of a survey conducted and compiled by
Zentralarchiv ftir Empirische Sozialforschung. The survey, which embodies the most current
international survey data available on a broad range of global issues, is part of the International Social Survey Program (ISSP) and is titled ISSP: National Identity 1996. 2 This survey
focuses on respondents' attitudes toward issues of national identity and international relations,
and includes many demographic variables on the respondents.
Description of the Dependent Variable
Table I provides the survey item on immigration-policy preferences and summarizes the
responses. The question asks for the respondent to reveal the direction of their preferences for
immigration policies, yet it does not indicate what labor markets would be affected. Using this
question implicitly assumes that the respondent has some understanding of the effects of
immigration policy changes on their individual welfare.
Typical of research employing survey data, missing data can be problematic and the
treatment of missing data is covered in the next section of this paper. It is important to note here,
however, that the overall response rate to the policy-oriented immigration question exceeds 91
percent. The response rate ranges from 83 percent for Japan to over 96 percent for Australia.
Figure 1 provides the number of respondents answering either, 'reduced a little" or "reduced a
lot" as a percent of those responding (missing values are excluded from this chart). The figure
shows that the percentage agreeing that policymakers should limit immigration ranges from more
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than 76 percent in Germany to just over 21 percent in the Ireland. The average across all of the
nations in the sample is 59 percent. Hence, in this sample, there is an absolute majority in favor
of restricting the number of immigrants in the respondent's country. Nonetheless, there is a great
deal of variation across countries and this variation should be accounted for in an empirical
study.
Summary and Description of the Independent Variables
This study is specifically designed to test the robustness of skill level as a determinant of
immigration-policy preferences in the advanced economies. The authors allow for two differ- ent
specifications in order to employ two possible measures of skill. Similar to the previously cited
studies, one measure of skill they include is education. A second measure employed is the
respondent's income relative to the national average in the respondent's country in a second
model. 3 An additional test of the robustness of skill level is to include other indi- vidual
characteristics related studies show to be statistically significant determinants. Age, gender,
citizenship, trade union membership, and political ideology are, therefore, included as
explanatory variables. (Italy, New Zealand, and Japan are excluded from the remainder of this
study because the item on income was not completed in the survey.) Table 2 provides summary
statistics of the independent variables.
Educations and age are measured in numbers of years; earnings is the respondent's
income as a percentage of the mean value for the respondent's nation of residence; gender
equals 1 for males and 0 for females; citizenship equals 1 if the respondent is not a citizen, 2 if a
parent is not a citizen, 3 if neither parents are citizens, and 4 if neither the respondent or a parent
are citizens, and 0 otherwise; political ideology ranges from 1 for far left to 5 for far right; trade
union membership equals 1 if the respondent is a member of a trade union and 0 otherwise.
Gender is a dichotomous variable that takes the value of unity for male and zero for
female. Age is a continuous variable. Citizenship examines whether the respondent and or a
combination of their parent(s) is (are) citizens of the respondent's country. The variable ranges
from one, indicating that the respondent and both parents are citizens, to four, indicating that
neither the respondent nor one of the parents is a citizen. Previous studies are unclear as to the
effect of gender on attitudes toward immigration. Based on trade policy studies, older
respondents are expected to favor policies that restrict immigration. In addition, non-citizens are
expected to oppose policies that restrict immigration. Political Ideology is a categorical variable
that ranges from one, indicating someone who places themself at the far left, to five, indicating
someone who places themself at the far right. Previous studies conclude that more conservative
respondents are more likely to support immigration restrictions. Following studies of U.S.
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residents, Trade Union Membership is included as an explanatory variable. It is a dichotomous
variable equal to unity if the respondent is now, or once was, a member of a trade union and zero
otherwise. Previous studies conclude that trade union members are more likely to favor
protectionist policies. Given the documented role of trade union membership in affecting trade
restrictions in the above studies, it is expected that trade union members are more likely to favor
restrictions on immigration.
The remaining variables measure the individual respondent's skill level. Education is a
continuous variable measured in years. Education is expected to correlate negatively with the
dependent variable. That is, respondents with higher levels of education are more likely to
disagree with policy actions that restrict immigration.
Earnings is a continuous measure of the respondent's annual income in terms of the
domestic currency. To create a variable suitable for cross-country comparison, the mean value
of income is calculated in each individual nation. The individual respondent's income is then
expressed as a percentage of the mean pertaining to their nation of residence.4It is expected,
therefore, that a relatively lower-income will correlate with preferences to restrict immigration.
Finally, to capture individual country differences, a dummy variable is included for each country.5

Econometric Approach and Results
In the empirical analysis, the immigration-policy question is modeled as an ordered
choice model with five possible answers as detailed in Table 1. Given that the multiple categories
of responses to the survey question follow a natural order, ordered probit (OP) estimation
techniques are employed, which also allows the authors to readily compare many of their results
to previous literature.
Missing Values
The first difficulty lies in addressing the problem of missing values, a common problem in
empirical treatments of survey data. (Missing values for the data used here can be found in
Tables 1 and 2.) There are basically two approaches to handling missingness. The first approach
is to omit the cases with missing values via listwise deletion. Listwise deletion, however, may
result in biased estimates if the deleted cases systematically differ from the observed cases.
Listwise deletion also reduces the efficiency of estimates because important information is lost.
The most common alternative to listwise deletion is to impute values for missing data.
Multiple imputation does not assume that the missing data is missing at random as does listwise
deletion. Rather it generates correct uncertainty estimates conditional on the data used to impute
missing values. To generate data sets with imputed values for missing data, the authors use the
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EMis algorithm of Amelia: A Program for Missing Data, by Honaker et al. [2000]. The reader is
referred to King et al. [2001] for a detailed description of the advantages of this approach and the
EMis algorithm.
The process of imputing values involves three steps. The first step is to generate multiple
data sets containing imputed values for missing data. Based on the size of the data set and
following King et al., five data sets are generated for all applications in this study. The imputed
values are generated using all of the observed data employed in the regression analysis as
described above. The second step is to estimate a regression model for all of the imputed data
sets, thereby creating multiple coefficient estimates. The final step is to combine the estimated
coefficients and standard errors. Although the literature indicates a preference for regression
analysis based on imputed values, estimates based on listwise deletion were also generated and
are available upon request.
OP Estimates
The five imputed data sets were used to generate the OP estimates for two aggregate
models and two sets of individual country estimates. The estimated parameters of the five
imputed data sets were combined together and are provided below. Model coefficients are the
mean estimates of the five imputed data sets. The standard errors are found by averaging the
mean standard error across the five data sets and combining this value with the standard error
across the five data sets, which is adjusted for the fact that the number of observations is less
than infinity.
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is the number of imputed data sets.
Two different aggregate models are estimated. The first, the baseline model, contains the

demographic variables (age, gender, political ideology, trade union membership, and citizenship), and one measure of skill: income. To capture country specific effects on immigrationpolicy preferences, a country dummy variable is included in each model for each of the ten
countries. (The dummy variables are jointly significant across all both models.) The second
model replaces income with education as a measure of skill. The dependent variable in each
model is the response to the immigration-policy question described in Table 1.
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TABLE 3 (CONT)
Income
Sweden
Canada

0.227148***
(0.0418039)
-0.415431"**
(0.0359265)

Education
0.193794***
(0.041531)
-0.248226"**
(0.0369057)

Table 3 provides the parameter estimates for the aggregate models. The coefficients that
are statistically significant carry their expected signs over all three specifications. Further, across
all three models, age, citizenship, political ideology, and the skill level (however measured) are
always significant at a 1 percent level of significance. Thus, the results imply that older
individuals and individuals who view themselves as politically conservative are more likely to
favor policies that restrict immigration. Individuals who are not citizens, or whose parents are not
citizens of the respondent's country are less likely to favor policies that restrict immigration.
Further, as skill level increases (measured by education or relative income), respondents are
less likely to favor policies that restrict immigration. In the individual country regressions, the
authors focus on the trade union variable. In the aggregate models the coefficient associated
with trade union membership is positive and significant at a one percent level of significance in
both models. Thus, trade union members are more likely to indicate a preference for policies that
restrict immigration.
To better understand the impact of increases in skill on immigration-policy preferences,
increases in skill level are simulated to isolate their impact on the probability that an individ- ual
chooses one of the responses to the survey question detailed in Table 1. The simulation is
conducted in the following manner using Clarify: Software for Interpreting and Presenting
Statistical Results, Tomz et al. [2001]. First, 1,000 simulated parameters are drawn from an
asymptotic sampling distribution that is multivariate normal, and whose mean is equal to the
vector of parameter estimates and variance equal to the variance-covariance matrix of estimates.
Next, the simulated parameters are used to calculate two sets of probabilities. First, all the
explanatory variables are set at their actual value except for the measure of skill level, which is
set at its median value. From this, the predicted probability of response is generated to each
category of the immigration-policy question. Then, skill level is increased in value to its 90 th
percentile (one standard deviation), and a second set of probabilities for each response category
is calculated. The changes in these two sets of probabilities are graphically illustrated in Figures
2 and 3. Figures 2 and 3 illustrate the fact that increases in skill level are likely to increase the
probability that a respondent favors policies that increase immigration or leave immigration
unchanged; and decrease the probability that a respondent favors policies that decrease
immigration. It is only the degree to which these probabilities change that differs between the skill
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measures used.
Frey [1992, p. 230] argues that because empirical research has been predominately
focused on the United States, it makes it difficult to determine what part of the results are due to
public choice views and the part due to "particular conditions obtaining to the United States."
It is important, therefore, not to generalize across countries the characteristics that influence
immigration-policy preferences.
Daniels and von der Ruhr [2002] argue that, in regard to policies that restrict international
trade of goods, trade union membership as a determinant of individual policy preferences cannot
be generalized across countries. Their evidence leads the authors to consider whether the
importance of trade union membership as a determinant of preference toward policies restricting
immigration may vary over different countries. Furthermore, because the country- specific
dummies were jointly significant in the previous specifications, there are systematic differences
across the ten countries. Consequently, the authors are interested in examining these
specifications on a country-by-country level to explore country-specific influences on
immigration-policy preferences. To conduct the country-level analysis, they estimate the two
models for each individual country. Again, estimates are made for each imputed data set and the
coefficients and standard errors are calculated in the manner described earlier. The results are,
in most respects, similar to the aggregated results. Because of space considerations, the full
results are not provided here, but are available upon request. An important and interesting
difference, however, is the impact of trade union membership. Table 4 provides the estimated
coefficients and standard errors for trade union membership of each nation in the sample.
Table 4 shows that trade union membership is significant in the income model for
Australia, West Germany, Sweden and Canada, at the 5 percent level, and for Austria at the 10
percent level. In model two (education) it is significant for Australia and Canada at the 5 percent
level and for Sweden at the 10 percent level. Hence, in the aggregate specifications, trade union
membership as a determinant of immigration-policy preference is primarily driven by the
significance of this variable for only a subset of nations.6
Though the authors do not explore this result in greater detail here, it may have
implications for the possibility of the coordination of trade union activities across nation borders.
After all, if trade union members in one nation do not have the same attitudes toward immigration
as trade union members in another nation, it may prove impossible to achieve international
solidarity as suggested by authors such as Sebbens [2000]. They leave the issue of trade union
membership as a determinant of individual preferences toward global economic policies as a
recommendation for future research.
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Summary and Conclusion
A number of empirical studies on the United States show that respondents' revealed
preferences for immigration-policies that restrict immigration are consistent with the HeckscherOhlin theorem. That is, respondents with higher skills oppose such policies while those with
lower skills favor such policies. This paper presented survey data on preferences for immigration
policies for ten advanced economies. Within the entire sample, it was found that preferences
toward immigration-policies are split 59 percent in favor of reducing immigration, and 39 percent
in favor of either increasing immigration or leaving it unchanged. Nonetheless, there is
considerable variation in the mean response across counties. Using an ordered probit model, the
authors find that respondents' skill level--as measured by education and income is a robust
determinant of immigration-policy preferences in a sample of 10 advanced economies.
Interestingly, while trade union membership is significant in the specifications applied to the
aggregated data, individual country regressions show that trade union membership is a
statistically significant, robust determinant of immigration-policy preferences only in a small
number of countries.
This study, therefore, makes a number of important contributions to the existing literature.
Specifically, cross-country data are presented on the general public's immigration-policy
preferences and illustrate that individual skill-level is a robust determinant of immigration- policy
preferences. Hence, the general results found for the United States are robust across a large
sample of developed economies. Part of the gap between public opinion and the actual
economic impact of immigration, therefore, is due to perceptions (arguably misperceptions) that
immigration increases unemployment and reduces wages of low-skilled workers in the
destination country.
Further, the authors show that conditions particular to the respondent's country of
residence need to be separated from public-choice results. Specifically they provide results
indicating that the influence of trade union membership as a determinant of immigration-policy
preferences is unique to a subset of countries and, therefore, should not be generalized across
nations. Future research should examine the determinants of immigration-policy preferences
across time as well as across countries. Additionally the similarities and differences of the
preferences of trade union members across countries should be further examined to determine
the underlying reason(s) for differences in immigration-policy preference for trade union
members in different nations.
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Footnotes
*. Marquette University and St. Norbert College—U.S.A.
1. A last approach that is discussed in the literature, but not well suited to this paper
(due to limitations introduced by using the international data set we use in this paper) is the
area analysis model. In this model, there is a single output market, but unlike the preceding
discussion, the labor market is locally segmented. Thus, the effect on wages depends on the
segment of the market in which the individual lives along with that person's skill level. The
relationship between skill level and immigration-policy preferences discussed under the
factor-proportions-analysis model will hold for individuals located in areas that experience the
inflow of immigrants. Individuals located in areas that do not absorb the immigrants will not
illustrate a link between skill level and immigration-policy preferences.
2. Independent institutions in each country collected the data for the ISSP. Neither
the original collectors nor the ZENTRALARCHIV bear any responsibility for the analyses or
interpretation presented here.
3. Scheve and Slaughter include occupational wage as an alternative measure of
skill. O'Rourke and Sinnott [2001], however, use the International Standard Classification of
Occupations (ISCO) as a measure of skill. This classification, however, does not necessarily
following a logical ordering of skill. Hence, the authors do not include it as an explanatory
variable here. Results of this model, however, are available upon request. The ISCO can be
found on the International Labour Organization's Website at
www.ilo.org/public/EngYzsh/bureau/stat/class/isco.htm.
4. This particular measure may include income from sources other than wages and
salaries and, therefore, may not entirely reflect skill level. This, of course, is a caveat to the
model that uses income as a measure of skill level.
5. In an alternative approach, we account for cross-country differences by including
an immigration openness variable, constructed as the number of immigrants relative to the
labor force in each country during the year of the survey. The results of that specification are
both qualitatively and quantitatively similar to the results provided here, and are available
upon request.
6. As pointed out by one referee, U.S. union member do not oppose immigration,
with is consistent with the AFL-CIO [February, 2000], whose position on immigration is that
"The AFL-CIO proudly stands on the side of immigrant workers. Throughout the history of
this country, immigrants have played an important role in building our nation and its
democratic institutions. New arrivals from every continent have contributed their energy,
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talent, and commitment to making the United States richer and stronger. Likewise, the
American union movement has been enriched by the contribu- tions and courage of
immigrant workers. Newly arriving workers continue to make indispensable contributions to
the strength and growth of our unions."
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Appendix
Table 1: Summary of Survey Item
Do you think the number of immigrants to (Respondent’s country) should be…
Response 1

Increased a lot

Response 2

Increased a little

Response 3

Remain the same as it is

Response 4

Reduced a lot

Response 5

Reduced a lot

Mean Response

3.780

Median Response

4.000

Standard Deviation

1.030

Number of Respondents

14,601

Number of Observations

13,410
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Table 2: Summary Data on Independent Variables
Variable

Mean

Median
12.00
93.19
43.00
2.00
1.05
3.00

Standard
Deviation
12.79
67.70
16.64
0.50
0.58
1.61

Number
Observed
14,194
12,076
14,412
14,504
14,601
13,000

Education
Earnings
Age
Gender
Citizenship
Political
Ideology
Trade Union
Membership

14.23
99.98
45.27
1.52
1.17
3.41
1.68

2.00

0.48

12,198

Educations and age are measured in numbers of years; earnings is the respondent's income as
a percentage of the mean value for the respondent's nation of residence; gender equals 1 for
males and 0 for females; citizenship equals 1 if the respondent is not a citizen, 2 if a parent is not
a citizen, 3 if neither parents are citizens, and 4 if neither the respondent or a parent are citizens,
and 0 otherwise; political ideology ranges from 1 for far left to 5 for far right; trade union
membership equals 1 if the respondent is a member of a trade union and 0 otherwise.
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Table 3: Ordered Probit Estimates for Models 1 through 2
Gender
Age
Trade Union Membership
Political Ideology
Income

Income
0.019280
(0.0109693)
0.005602***
(0.0006617)
-0.063587***
(0.024467)
0.173584***
(0.0113607)
-0.001519***
(0.000146)

Education
Australia
Germany
Great Britain
United States
Austria
Ireland
Netherlands
Norway
Sweden
Canada

-1.708140***
(0.0653442)
0.488583***
(0.0425602)
0.309215***
(0.0482271)
0.110148***
(0.0426958)
0.021065
(0.0425791)
-0.675490***
(0.0413599)
0.056738*
(0.0353103)
0.094071***
(0.0373503)
0.227148***
(0.0418039)
-0.415431***
(0.0359265)

Education
-0.018265
(0.0182837)
0.002287***
(0.0006783)
-0.058564
(0.0236234)
0.171461***
(0.0108065)

-0.065681***
(0.003023)
-2.555812***
(0.076916)
0.432964***
(0.0440097)
0.272826***
(0.0473741)
0.193639***
(0.0422688)
-0.082588**
(0.0427078)
-0.675224***
(0.0416118)
0.103272***
(0.0353738)
0.125836***
(0.0374466)
0.193794***
(0.041531)
-0.248226***
(0.0369057)

Standard errors in parentheses. ***Significant at 1 percent. **Significant at 5 percent.
*Significant at 10 percent.
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Table 4: Ordered Probit Estimates of the Coefficient of Trade Union Membership
Australia
West Germany
Great Britain
U.S.A.
Austria
Ireland
Netherlands
Norway
Sweden
Canada

Income
0.08253228**
(0.04642174)
0.1486334**
(0.0683852)
-0.06126222
(0.08382202)
0.03783532
(0.0673445)
0.10532746*
(0.07476056)
-0.02032718
(0.08327844)
0.01032054
(0.05988328)
-0.06159008
(0.05900978)
0.12349572**
(0.071512)
0.13035558**
(0.056925)

Education
0.09164566**
(0.04633984)
0.07692568
(0.06888582)
-0.07226052
(0.08328108)
0.02211384
(0.0669835)
0.07289704
(0.07334856)
-0.05186114
(0.0808714)
0.05483676
(0.06019534)
-0.01948904
(0.05769802)
0.09181746*
(0.07003452)
0.118565**
(0.05693166)

Standard errors in parentheses. **Significant at 5 percent. *Significant at 10 percent.
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Figure 1: Percentage Responding That Immigration Should be Reduced
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Figure 2: Change in Probability of Response to Change in Income
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Figure 3: Change in Probability of Response to Change in Education
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